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Parliamentary entry on the national level is a crucial achievement for any new party. But its 
repercussions are not necessarily beneficial. This paper assesses the electoral consequences of 
parliamentary breakthrough by theorizing factors that shape a) a new party organization’s 
capacity to cope with pressures generated by parliamentary entry and b) the relative intensity 
of the new functional pressures a new party is exposed to after breakthrough. To test our 
hypotheses derived from these two rationales, we apply multilevel analyses to a new dataset 
covering 135 organizationally new parties that entered national parliament across 17 
advanced democracies over nearly five decades (1968-2015). Our findings stress the 
importance of party organizational characteristics (party origin, time for party building and 
leadership continuity) for parties’ capacity to sustain electoral support after breakthrough. In 
contrast, the intensity of functional pressures as generated by government participation 
immediately after breakthrough does not have significant effects on parties’ performance at 
the follow-up election. 
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Introduction: New Party Performance after Parliamentary Breakthrough 
Only very few new parties that compete at elections ever reach sufficient levels of support to 
enter national parliament, even in systems with low parliamentary thresholds such as the 
Netherlands (Krouwel and Lucardie 2008). While doubtlessly being an important 
achievement in a party’s development (Pedersen 1982; Lucardie 2000), the repercussions of 
national parliamentary breakthrough are not necessarily positive. This event confronts a new 
party with additional challenges that go beyond nominating candidates and running 
campaigns, which can create intra-organizational conflict and can have destabilizing effects 
(Heinisch 2003; Deschouwer 2008). Confronted with the new demands linked to 
parliamentary representation and sometimes even government participation, new entries 
might fade away quietly after the decline of initial electoral support or spectacularly 
disintegrate, a less frequent but much more noticed fate (e.g. Aylott 1995; Lucardie and 
Ghillebaert 2008; de Lange and Art 2011).
1
 Why some new parties can exploit parliamentary 
entry in their favour, while others become the ‘victim of their own success’ is an important 
question (van Haute and Pilet 2006) since only new parties that stay around are likely to 
broaden the representative offer to citizens or to push mainstream parties to adapt their 
profile. Nonetheless, cross-national studies rarely address this question across different party 




This paper addresses this gap by examining how new parties that have entered national 
parliaments in 17 advanced democracies over nearly five decades performed electorally after 
                                                          
1
 Electoral losses are only one possible consequence of weak party performance. Other dimensions studied in 
recent – quantitative or qualitative – research are parliamentary exit or organizational death (e.g. Spoon 2011; 
Bolleyer and Bytzek 2013). 
2
 In contrast, we find numerous excellent studies on new party formation and entry, e.g, Hug 2001; Tavits 2006; 
Bolin 2014, Zons 2013. For a cross-national study linking formation and success see Airo 2012. 
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their big breakthrough and why. As earlier research suggests that structural explanations such 
as institutional and sociological conditions seem not very helpful to account for short-term 
electoral effects (Akkerman and de Lange 2012: 577-8), we propose – mainly building on 
Harmel and Svåsand (1993) - a party-centred perspective on new party performance instead 
(see also Bolleyer 2008; de Lange and Art 2011). We theorize factors that shape a) a new 
party organization’s capacity to cope with new demands related to parliamentary entry (e.g. 
leadership continuity vs. leadership change) and b) the relative intensity of these demands 
(e.g. parliamentary vs. government participation).  
 
We test the hypotheses derived from these two contrasting rationales using a new dataset 
encompassing 135 organizationally new parties that won a seat in their national parliament at 
least once (irrespective of vote share or programmatic profile) across 17 advanced 
democracies (1968-2015). Applying multilevel analyses, our findings stress the importance of 
new parties’ own characteristics rather than the intensity of institutionally generated 
pressures. We find significant and robust effects of the time the party had to build up its 
organization prior to its breakthrough and the nature of its origin on the electoral costs of 
parliamentary breakthrough as well as significant effects of the continuity of its leadership - 
with the latter not being robust in all democracies studied though. In part this complements 
recent findings indicating the importance of party origin to other dimensions of new party 
success (e.g. party organizational survival) (Bolleyer 2013: 84; Bolleyer and Bytzek 2013; 
Beyens et al 2015) than the one we examine here. More importantly, the relevance of the 
timing of breakthrough and of leadership continuity for the electoral costs of parliamentary 
breakthrough has – to our knowledge - not been examined in any large-N study. We conclude 
by discussing avenues for future research. 
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I. A Party-centred Perspective on New Parties after Breakthrough 
I.1 New Parties’ Capacity to Cope with Public Office  
While parliamentary entry is likely to create some strains in any new party, the capacity of 
new parties to cope with this challenge is likely to vary with the newcomers’ capacity to 
operate effectively in parliament. While much of the literature has been preoccupied with 
new entries’ ‘ideological newness’ and how their profiles affect their chances of survival or 
their level of success (e.g. Lucardie 2000; Abedi 2004; Megiud 2007), comparative work on 
party persistence and decline as well as case study research urges us to consider how parties 
as organizational actors operate when confronted with new challenges (e.g. Harmel and 
Svåsand 1993; Rose and Mackie 1998; Deschouwer 2008; Mudde 2007; Art 2011; Akkerman 
and de Lange 2012). We theorize four factors reflecting this rationale. 
 
Building an organization able to sustain itself in face of (often conflicting) internal and 
external demands takes time. Simultaneously, Harmel and Svåsand have stressed (1993) that 
new parties often face the challenge that different stages of their development (each of which 
generating distinct demands) are squeezed in a short period of time. Once a party enters 
parliament, they argue, the attention of leading actors tends to shift from building and 
managing their party organization and consolidating a support base to their new 
responsibilities as parliamentarians (if they join government even as ministers). This shifting 
of priorities is naturally more problematic early in a party’s life cycle. If a party enters 
parliament right after its formation, party founders or leaders might simply not have had the 
time to build a viable extra-parliamentary infrastructure able to keep followers’ loyal, not to 
speak of the formation of a fully institutionalized party organization in which party followers 
and representatives consider the survival of the party as an end in itself (Panebianco 1988; de 
Lange and Art 2011). We therefore formulate the following hypothesis: 
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H1: The earlier after their foundation new parties enter national parliament, the more votes 
they lose at the follow-up election. 
 
Classical studies on party development in Western democracies have long argued that any 
party’s organizational development is shaped by its origin (Duverger 1981; Panebianco 
1988). Recent work by Bolleyer has distinguished parties formed by individual entrepreneurs 
from party formations that are promoted by existing societal organizations and stressed this 
distinction’s importance for new parties’ organizational survival (2013: 39-41; 84). The basic 
argument goes that thanks to followers’ already established group affiliation, they are 
inclined to identify with the party and are less likely to defect, even when at times 
disappointed by their party. If this rationale holds, it has implications for the relative costs of 
parliamentary breakthrough: rooted parties should be more able to cope with their first 
parliamentary entry and limit potential electoral losses in case of weak performance than 
entrepreneurial parties. At the same time, ties to promoter organizations can serve as a 
recruitment pool for possible party personnel already used to operate in organizational 
contexts and willing to prioritize the interests of the party rather than their own (Art 2011). If 
elected to parliament those might find it easier to adapt to the demands of operating as part of 
a parliamentary group, improving the likelihood of a decent performance of rooted 
formations during their first term.
3
 
H2: Entrepreneurial new parties lose more votes at the election following their parliamentary 
breakthrough than rooted new parties. 
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 The rooted-entrepreneurial distinction is more suitable for our purposes than the distinction between ‘newly 
born party’ (built from scratch) and ‘split’ or ‘splinter’ (formed by a defector or out of a faction of another 
party) (e.g. Mair 1999; Krouwel and Lucardie 2008; Beyens et al 2015). The group of ‘newly born formation’ 
cross-cuts the distinction between entrepreneurial and rooted party (as newly borns can have the support of 
promoter organizations or not), while the ‘splinter category’ includes defecting MPs founding their own (often 
one man) party as well as parties built on (external) factions from established party organizations, some of 
which can rely on organizational resources. Such intra-group diversity means that the status of being a splinter 
as compared to being newly born does not generate clear-cut theoretical expectations regarding which origin is 
associated with which (dis)advantages (e.g. a recruitment pool for personnel, loyal supporters) regarding party’s 
parliamentary performance.  
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While the loyal support from promoter organizations and time for party building are expected 
to facilitate institutionalization (i.e. a party’s organizational consolidation), the ability to cope 
with leadership turnover is generally considered a critical test whether a party as organization 
has truly institutionalized (Janda 1980: 19). If organizationally new parties have not yet fully 
consolidated when entering parliament for the first time, leadership skills but also leadership 
continuity can be considered crucial to keep the organization together (Pauwels 2014: 66; 
Mudde 2007). Whether parties are new or well established, leadership changes are generally 
considered destabilizing events (Harmel et al 1995: 5; see also Bynander and 't Hart 2008). 
Parties have little incentive to replace a leader who successfully pursues its goals (Ennser-
Jedenastik and Müller 2015: 932), which holds all the more for a new party as “few visible 
actions are taken for it by other than its leader” (Harmel and Svåsand 1993: 72). This leader 
(often taking over one of the party’s first seats or its only seat) shapes the party’s 
communication with the public as its most visible spokesperson. If the leader embodying a 
party that just experienced its’ probably biggest ever success (i.e. winning its first national 
seats) is replaced or leaves during the party’s first parliamentary term – deliberately (i.e. as 
result of or regulated by party procedure
4
) or involuntary (i.e. an expression of crisis) – we 
expect negative effects on the party’s electoral performance at the next election. When 
electoral loyalties are still fluid, many voters are likely to connect to a new party solely or 
predominantly through the particular personality of the leader (which differs from active 
members who also know the organization and its programme). As Litton argued recently, the 
change of a party’s leader can be assumed to be more crucial for its public recognition than 
change, for instance, of its programme since “for the most part, voters are not knowledgeable, 
interested or equipped to understand political information in general” (2015: 714). 
Consequently, particularly in regards to not very well known new parties, discontinuity in 
                                                          
4
For instance, Green parties might have incompatibility or rotation rules for central party and public positions or 
the party might schedule a leadership election to renew itself. 
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this central identification figure opens up the possibility that those followers reorient 
themselves away from the newcomer towards one of its competitors. Taking all this together, 
we expect the repercussions of leadership discontinuity during a party’s first ever term in 
parliament to be negative. 
H3: Those parties whose leaders stay in charge after parliamentary breakthrough until the 
next election lose fewer votes than parties which experience leadership discontinuity in that 
period. 
 
While the observation that new parties run the risk of becoming ‘victims of their own 
success’ is valid for inexperienced newcomers on the left and on the right (e.g. van Haute and 
Pilet 2006; Deschouwer 2008), the argument has been most prominent in the literature on 
parties of the new right (e.g. Carter 2005; Mudde 2007; Art 2011). Members of this new 
party family are portrayed as organizationally weak, electoral vehicles that are dominated by 
a single (more often than not founding) leader. This leader might be not interested in long-
term investments such as party building or even undermine the development of a viable 
infrastructure to protect his or her position in the party (Ignazi 2003; Carter 2005; ; Bolleyer 
2013). Although recent studies rightfully stress the diversity of these parties’ societal and 
organizational underpinnings (Art 2011) and their varying capacity to cope with public office 
– parliament or government (Akkermans and de Lange 2012; Bolleyer et al 2012; Pauwels 
2014), the most extreme examples of party disintegration and decline still fall in that group 
such as New Democracy in Sweden or One Nation Australia. These cases might point to a 
particular vulnerability of hierarchical and highly centralized parties as linked to an excessive 
organizational dependency on one single (often founding) leader on whom organizational 
power is concentrated. A leader’s concern to protect his or her position of (widely 
unrestricted) power in an organization might, in turn, be difficult to reconcile with managerial 
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demands that confront a leader once represented in parliament for the first time.
5
 As far as 
new right parties tend towards such leadership structures, we can formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
H4: Parties belonging to the new right family lose more votes at the elections following their 




I.2 The Demands of Parliament vs. the Demands of Government 
While the demands that parliamentary politics impose on parties (e.g. the intensified need to 
recruit competent representatives, to assure effective intra-party coordination, to cope with 
media scrutiny) are similar across the range of advanced democracies, performance pressure 
is widely considered to be more intense when parties take over government responsibility 
visible in the take-over of own ministries. While government participation can mean access to 
valuable resources (e.g. through patronage), this move is mostly considered as detrimental for 
a new party. Government participation creates the risk of strong negative incumbency effects. 
Parties holding ministries have policy influence which raises voter expectations towards what 
the party is likely to deliver (Rose and Mackie 1983). With very few exceptions, new parties 
in advanced democracies play the role of the junior partner and minor parties usually find it 
difficult to shape government policy and implement core preferences against the resistance of 
their bigger partners and are consequently often punished by the electorate (e.g.  O’Malley 
2011). Furthermore, new parties often find it difficult to cope with their new responsibilities 
professionally, e.g. to assure internal communication and, more specifically, regulate 
conflicts between its representatives in public office and its extra-parliamentary base 
                                                          
5
 While historically far-left parties have promoted democratic centralism, this is particularly true for the usually 
older communist parties which are excluded from our study focusing on formations post-1968. By now, many of 
the newer far left parties have started to promote a version of grass roots democracy more similar to the Greens 
or have started to promote collective leadership structures (March 2011; March and Keith 2016). Due to this 
organizational diversity, this group of new parties cannot be associated as clearly to a hierarchical, leader-
centred model as the group of new right parties. 
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(Bolleyer 2008). Finally, new parties often enter parliament with strong anti-establishment 
credentials with the help of a protest vote (Abedi 2004). While they can maintain this image 
after breakthrough by playing the role of a principled opposition party in parliament, they 
face a considerable risk to alienate followers and thus to deteriorate their support base when 
being seen to actively collaborate with established elites in government (Heinisch 2003; 
McDonnell and Newell 2011). While this is not to say that government responsibility does 
not offer benefits (such as prestige, influential parliamentary posts, ministerial resources or 
policy influence) new parties often find it difficult to exploit these benefits, an observation 
leading to our final hypothesis: 
 
H5: New parties that take over government responsibility lose more votes at the election 




II. Data and Measurement 
II.1 Defining and Specifying New Parties 
Following Bolleyer and Bytzek (2013), we define ‘newness’ in terms of parties’ 
organizational development rather than the newness of the issues that they represent. 
Organizationally new parties still need to build a viable, self-sufficient infrastructure 
consolidated by a (relatively) stable support base, which makes these parties more vulnerable 
than and thus distinct from the group of established or ‘organizationally mature’ parties. They 
classified parties as new if they are built from scratch (‘newly born’), and if they originate 
from minor splits of established parties. They further included mergers involving ‘newly 
borns’ or splits. Successor parties were excluded as well the mergers of old parties that start 
out from several established party organizations.  The same goes for mergers between old and 
organizationally new parties, whenever old parties in effect ‘swallowed’ the remainders of 
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organizationally new parties, i.e. ‘new’ formations that in effect are an organizational 
continuation of established parties (for more details, see Bolleyer and Bytzek 2013).  
 
The basic vulnerability of new parties as relatively immature organizations is particularly 
important to a party’s evolution when the latter is confronted with new challenges and 
pressures as the case when a party enters national parliament. While parliamentary entry 
constitutes a significant short-term success and opens access to new resources, 
organizationally new parties are not only less consolidated but also less experienced in 
holding public office than established parties. As argued earlier, the exposure to new 
functional pressures (e.g. involvement in law-making) combined with intense media scrutiny 
can easily have destabilizing effects which is why this event is so important in a party’s life 
cycle. Reflecting our analytical focus on organizationally new party performance in the 
decisive phase after their national breakthrough, we look at the subset of organizationally 
new parties that won seats in their national parliament at least once.
6
 We identified new 
formations meeting these two criteria from 1968 onwards, a period when citizens’ party 
affiliations underpinning formerly ‘frozen party systems’ in advanced democracies started to 
de-align (e.g. Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Bartolini and Mair 2007).7 The increasing flexibility 
of voters’ choices created a ‘window of opportunity’ for new party entry and thus their 
electoral sustainability, showing in higher numbers of newly formed parties participating in 
national elections, entering national parliaments and defending a niche on the national level 
(e.g. Mair 1999; Hug 2001). Thus, to pin down the factors that shape new party performance 
gained increasing importance over the period studied. 
                                                          
6
 The national threshold is operationalized through a party’s entry into the first house of parliament. An 
exception is made with regard to Australia, where entry into the Senate is considered as similarly important for a 
new party as entry into the House of Representatives as the (equally powerful) Australian Senate has a more 
proportional electoral system (and thus more representative make-up) than the one of the House of 
Representatives. 
7
 Consequently, the oldest, organizationally new formations in our dataset were formed in 1968 and at the 




II.2 Dataset and Dependent Variable  
Our data collection focused on organizationally new parties operating in established party 
systems to assure a basic comparability of the challenges new parties face when entering the 
parliamentary stage (a situation that is substantially different if the majority of rivalling 
parties are new and inexperienced as well). More specifically, our dataset covers new parties 
that (re)entered their national parliament in 14 European democracies plus Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand
8
 (i.e. winning one seat at least once) between 1968 and 2015 irrespective of 
their vote share (i.e. the first breakthrough election took place in 1968, the last follow-up 
election in 2015).9 Our sample covers 135 parties, which is highly inclusive, not only in 
electoral terms (parties are included irrespective of their national vote share, which in some 
cases is as low as 0.1% of the national vote) but also when compared to studies that restrict 
themselves to particular, ideologically defined, new party families.  
To capture parties’ performance patterns, we chose the difference between the percentage of 
the national vote a party won at the first election after breakthrough and the share it won at 
its breakthrough election divided by the party’s vote share at the breakthrough election as 
our dependent variable ((VoteElect2-VoteElect1)/VoteElect1). This captures the relative vote 
loss of parties between two elections and thus measures a party’s vulnerability best since it 
effectively distinguishes between a party that has won 10% of the vote in its breakthrough 
                                                          
8
 These are the UK, Ireland, Iceland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, 
Switzerland, Luxembourg, Austria, and France. 
9
 The relevant sample of parties entering national parliament for the first time from 1968 onwards and the 
respective electoral data were identified based on cross-national datasets (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/, 
the EJPR data yearbook and the Caramani dataset on elections in Western Europe (2000)). Importantly, parties 
in the ‘others’ category (that had remained unidentified) were disaggregated, using official election statistics or 
more detailed country-specific data bases (e.g. http://www.ibzdgip.fgov.be/result/nl/search.php?type=year; 
http://elections.uwa.edu.au; http://www.anneepolitique.ch/de/aps-online.php; www.electionresults.govt.nz). 
Each of these new entries was then specified as organizationally new or removed. 
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election and loses 2% in the upcoming election (in this case our dependent variable is 0.2, a 
mean vote loss of 20% with regard to vote shares at the breakthrough election) and a party 
that won 3% at its breakthrough election and loses 2% (hence facing a relative vote loss of 
0.67, or a 67% vote loss with regard to vote shares at breakthrough election). Using relative 
vote loss as dependent variable thus also assures comparability between parties. 56.3% of the 
parties in our sample lose votes at the election after their parliamentary breakthrough. 8.1% 
maintain their vote share, while only 35.6% gain votes. The average absolute loss among 
those 76 new parties that are punished electorally is 2.7%, with relative vote loss being 0.5 
(or 50%).  
II.3 Measuring the Explanatory Variables  
Our analytical framework identified five explanatory variables that are operationalized in the 
following manner. First, the time for party building is measured through the number of years 
between the foundation of the party and its parliamentary breakthrough. The average time 
between foundation and breakthrough is 3.9 years and ranges from 0 (i.e. breakthrough in the 
year of foundation) to breakthrough 40 years after foundation. Second, to capture the 
distinction between entrepreneurial vs rooted new parties operationally, we relied on the 
classification provided in Bolleyer’s study that classified 140 new parties regarding whether 
their foundation was supported by one or several identifiable promoter organizations or 
groups or not. The types of promoter organizations were leftist groups, environmental groups, 
women’s organizations, religious groups, unions/employer organizations, 
conservative/nationalist/far right groups, regionalist/separatist groups and ethnic groups 
(2013: 43-3, Table 2.2). In essence, new formations qualified as rooted when their foundation 
was supported by a societal group that predated the actual formation and at that time had in 
place an at least rudimentary organizational infrastructure including voluntary members or 
affiliates contributing to the organization’s maintenance (for more details see Bolleyer 2013: 
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40-1). Of the 135 cases in our dataset 66 parties were entrepreneurs (48.9%). Third, drawing 
on available primary sources and earlier case study research, we coded a new variable 
capturing leadership discontinuity, coding each party in our sample either as 0 if the same 
leadership stayed in office from its breakthrough until after the follow-up election and as 1 if 
it experienced leadership change during its first term. We defined the party leader as the party 
official (or the party leadership as the officials) in charge of managing the party’s relations 
and communications with the general public (distinct from officials who run a party’s day-to-
day operations).
10
 While the party leader usually takes over one of the party’s first seats, this 
does not have to be the case. In parties with collective leadership structures we considered as 
sufficient for discontinuity that one core figure withdraws or is replaced.
11
 This avoided a 
bias in favour of coding discontinuity in centralized, leader-centred parties by requiring in 
parties with several leadership figures several changes to establish discontinuity rather than 
just one. Importantly, in line with our theoretical argument we measured discontinuity as 
such and did not distinguish between changes that resulted from internal crises from a 
(supposedly) ‘regular’ or ‘neutral’ leadership (re)selection or from the simple implementation 
of a rotation system or incompatibility rules that force party leaders to step back when 
winning a seat to avoid a concentration of power. This had considerable methodological 
advantages since the mere occurrence of change can be more reliably coded (especially when 
covering minor parties that ceased to exist decades ago) than requiring the coders to 
distinguish ‘problematic’ leadership discontinuity resulting from some sort of crisis from 
‘unproblematic’ or ‘rule-based’ discontinuity. While extreme cases such as leaders leaving 
                                                          
10
 Depending on the country looked at, this role might be called ‘party president’ or ‘party chairman’. In cases of 
parties that refused to have a formal leader, we considered the party spokesperson as functionally equivalent 
role. In the few cases where there were neither leaders nor formal spokespeople we consulted the case study 
literature regarding who belonged to the core leadership and whether of them withdrew (voluntarily or not) from 
their prominent role between breakthrough and follow-up election.  
11
 In the few cases in which parties dissolved even before the follow-up election, we considered this as cases of 
leadership discontinuity (in fact its complete loss). Similarly, where the party consisted of its leader only 
holding a single seat, we considered his or her exit before the follow-up election or the decision to run under 
another label or for another party as indication of discontinuity. 
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their party in protest (possibly to form a new party of their own) can be easily characterized, 
the scheduling of a new leadership selection process can be the result of intra-organizational 
difficulties or can trigger them unintentionally. In cases that did not involve severe, publically 
displayed infighting, this distinction is not only very clear-cut and making it requires 
evaluations easily coloured by the party’s performance after the new leader took over, leading 
to circularity when trying to assess the electoral costs of leadership discontinuity. All parties 
were double-coded. Of our 135 parties, 46 (34.1%) experienced leadership discontinuity 
during their first parliamentary term. Fourth, we coded all organizationally new parties in our 
sample as new right that were qualified in the literature as anti-immigrant party (Art 2011), 
far or extreme right party (Ignazi 2003) or populist radical right (Mudde 2007). As van 
Spanje points out (2011), despite considerable terminological disagreements, these groups 
overlap widely and which parties form members of this party family is empirically little 
contested among experts. The coding of new right parties was mainly based on the 
classifications provided in the appendices of Mudde’s (2007) and van Spanje’s (2011). 
Parties not covered were classified based on Hainsworth (1992) and Betz and Immerfall 
(1998). New right parties were coded 1, other parties 0. 30 parties (22.2%) in our sample 
qualified as new right. Finally, a party takes over government responsibility when it formally 
participates in government coalitions visible in the taking over of ministerial posts. If parties 
held one or more ministerial post during their first term in parliament they were coded 1, 
otherwise they were coded 0. The relevant information was provided by the ParlGov 
Database (Döring and Manow 2012). 14 parties (10.4%) in our sample took over government 
responsibility (i.e. held ministries) right after their breakthrough election. 
  
II.4 Control Variables 
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We add five control variables that – drawing on the extensive literature on new parties – can 
be expected to shape a new party’s electoral performance. First, we control for the 
institutional entry barrier (parliamentary threshold) new parties need to cope with to access 
parliament. The national threshold of inclusion for each country is measured following the 
logic laid out in Taagepera (2002) capturing the minimum % of the national vote necessary to 
win one seat under the most favourable circumstances at a specific election.
12
 In systems, in 
which this threshold is high, we consider vote losses to be more likely than vote gains at the 
elections following breakthrough. The relationship between parliamentary threshold and our 
dependent variable should thus be negative. The average threshold is 0.5% of the national 
vote with a minimum of 0.1% and a maximum of 1.3%. Second, we control for the provision 
of state funding access and broadcasting access (standard controls in the study of new party 
formation and entry, Bolin 2012; Zons 2013), as these resources should make it easier for 
new parties to assure re-election. Each of the two variables takes on the value 1 if direct 
(electoral and/or organizational) state funding or, respectively, broadcasting access is 
provided, and 0 otherwise. Each variable has been coded on the party-level and captures the 
nature of the regimes in place when a party enters parliament. Third, we control for a new 
party’s ideological distinctiveness. Irrespective of the substantial nature of its ideology, a new 
entry that presents a genuinely new profile makes it harder for mainstream parties to credibly 
take over its core issues and win voters back than when being confronted with a party that 
represents, in principle, old issues but criticises the moderate position of the mainstream 
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 Following Taagepera, the most favourable situation for a party to gain at least one seat is when its vote is 
concentrated in one district. Consequently, for yielding the national threshold of inclusion (TI) the  
threshold of achieving representation in an average district is divided by the number of districts: TI = 
(75%/(M+1))/E, with M being the mean district magnitude and E being the number of districts. While this 
conceptualization of parliamentary threshold might be problematic when characterizing the effects of plurality 
vs. proportional electoral systems on party system fragmentation more generally, as our sample consists 
predominantly of very small, short-lived parties that only win a seat – especially in plurality systems - if 
circumstances are favourable (e.g. they have a concentrated vote), this measure is most suitable for our purposes 
as  it avoids an overestimation of access barriers small parties are confronted with. 
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parties or criticizes mainstream parties for neglecting them as compared to other issues in 
their programme (Lucardie 2000). Consequently, parties with a distinct offer are expected to 
be less vulnerable to vote losses. To capture newcomers’ relative ideological distinctiveness 
in their respective party systems, we use a dummy variable based on Abedi’s authoritative 
classification of ‘challenger’ parties, parties that challenge the status quo in terms of major 
policy and political system issues (2004: 11-14). We followed his classification to identify 
those new parties that qualified as distinct (1). Exceptions were made when parties had been 
classified as challengers that represented a variety of an ideology already occupied by another 
(in some cases also new) party in the party system. This was appropriate since unlike Abedi, 
we attempted to capture distinctiveness relative to the offer provided by competitors at the 
time of breakthrough. More recent formations in our dataset not covered by Abedi were 
classified along the same criteria. 50 (37.0%) among our 135 were classified as ideologically 
distinct. Finally, we control for GDP since economic performance is often considered an 
important variable that affect the electoral fate of parties. We measured GDP development (in 
1 million US dollars per capita) from breakthrough to follow-up election by making use of 
OECD data 2015 (doi: 10.1787/dc2f7aec-en, accessed on 17 July 2015).
13
  
For details on all variables see Appendix Table A2. 
 
III. Method and Findings 
Our data includes parties nested within elections nested within countries (76 of the 135 
parties in our sample are competing against at least one new party in the same election). 
Accordingly, we need a modelling strategy that accounts for the fact that our units of analysis 
are not independent from each other and enable us to model effects on all three levels 
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 Two new parties in the UK (Alliance Party of Northern Ireland, Green UK) had their breakthrough election in 
2010 and their second election in 2015, for the latter there is no GDP data available yet. Hence, data from 2014 
was used in these cases. 
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(Steenbergen and Jones 2002). We, therefore, estimate three-way nested random-effect 
multilevel regression models to explain new party electoral performance after breakthrough. 
The relative difference between the percentage of the national vote a party won at the first 
election after breakthrough and the share it won at its breakthrough election is our dependent 




- Table 1 about here - 
The findings provide support for three of our five hypotheses, all of which stress the 
importance of party characteristics helping the party to cope with new challenges. The time 
for party building a party had before breakthrough has a significant positive effect on its 
electoral performance after breakthrough as expected by H1. Accordingly, the timing of 
breakthrough affects whether parliamentary entry is likely to have negative rather than 
positive repercussions for a party’s electoral performance, stressing the need to take into 
account when a party reaches a qualitatively new stage in its development (Pedersen 1982). 
Similarly, our theoretical expectations were confirmed as far as the role of party origin is 
concerned (H2): Entrepreneurs perform significantly worse than rooted new formations, 
which underlines recent findings indicating that rooted formations persist longer as 
organizations and are more likely to re-enter into parliament (Bolleyer 2013; Bolleyer and 
Bytzek 2013; Beyens et al 2015).
14
 Similarly, leadership discontinuity affects a party’ 
electoral performance negatively (H3) (on a 10% significance level which we deem 
appropriate due to the low number of cases in the analyses). This finding, however, has to be 
                                                          
14
 The importance of societal roots echoes earlier research on the Greens that stressed the importance of their 
origins in social movements or environmental organizations (e.g. Kitschelt 1986; Poguntke 2002).  
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interpreted carefully, since it is less robust than the other significant variables in our model.
15
 
The finding suggests that leadership discontinuity might be often but not always negative for 
a new parties’ electoral performance after breakthrough. Finally, one of our control variables 
- GDP - has a positive effect on electoral performance, indicating the importance of the 
economic situation for parties’ electoral fortunes, which enhances confidence in our findings. 
Neither belonging to the new right family (H4), immediate government participation (H5) nor 
any other control variable has a significant effect on our dependent variable. 
The lacking impact of the new right dummy makes sense in light of the significant effect of 
the party origin variable suggesting it is only particular new right parties that are vulnerable, 
i.e. those lacking any social roots such as the Lijst Pim Fortuyn (Lucardie and Ghillebaert 
2008), not those which are rooted such as the French Front National or the Belgian Vlaams 
Belang which profit from linkage to nationalist movements (Art 2011). This is echoed by 
recent studies on the relative electoral costs government imposes on new right parties which 
vary with these parties’ organizational strategies that assure the functioning of the 
organization inside and outside public office (Akkermans and de Lange 2012). The absence 
of a significant effect of immediate government entry has similar implications, namely that 
government responsibility can be detrimental or beneficial, depending on the party we look 
at.
16
 Even though the functional pressures on new parties clearly increase when taking over 
such responsibilities and we know that some parties disintegrated as a consequence, some 
new parties successfully exploited government and benefited from the resources attached to it 
(Bolleyer et al 2012). Overall our findings suggest that ‘objective’ differences in the intensity 
of functional pressures are less crucial to understand the electoral implications of new parties’ 
                                                          
15
 Robustness checks regarding the vulnerability of our results to the exclusion of countries showed that both the 
effects of entrepreneur and time for party building is significant in 16 of 17 regression models, whereas the 
effect of leadership discontinuity is only significant in eight regression models. 
16
Note an interaction between GDP and government responsibility is equally insignificant, while our main 
variables still remain significant. 
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national entry than the organizational capacities of a particular party, which are shaped by its 
origin, the timing of parliamentary entry in a party’s life cycle, i.e. the point in its 
development a party is confronted with new challenges and pressures and the continuity of its 
leadership. 
To assess the real-world meaning of our findings, Table 2 reports the predicted values of 
Relative Vote Loss for different values of the three significant independent variables (the 
values of the respective other independent variables are set to their mean): Time for Party 
Building, Entrepreneur and Leadership Discontinuity. 
- Table 2 about here – 
 
Table 2 shows that entrepreneurial new parties lose on average 16.1% of their initial vote 
share at the next election, while rooted parties gain on average 16.5%. Consequently, the 
societal origins of parties are crucial for their fade at elections. Furthermore, the time for 
party building a party had prior to its breakthrough affects their electoral support at the 
following election and thus whether breakthrough is electorally beneficial or rather 
damaging: While parties that are less than ten years old tend to lose about 12% of their initial 
vote share at the next election, whereas older parties tend to win votes. Finally, parties that 
experience leadership discontinuity lose on average 15% of their initial vote share, while 
parties with leadership continuity gain on average 8.6%. In comparison, time for party 
building is thus more important for the electoral performance of a new party after 
breakthrough than being rooted in societal organizations and not facing leadership 
discontinuity in its first parliamentary term. Especially the simultaneous relevance of time for 
party building before breakthrough and party origin is insightful. While rooted parties might 
have insufficient time to build a strong organization if they enter parliament very early on and 
might (despite good starting conditions thanks to their links to promoter organizations) suffer 
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electorally, entrepreneurial parties might be able to build up a viable organization prior to 





Conclusion and Outlook 
Parliamentary entry is a crucial achievement for any new party. After all, most new 
formations never gain representation in their national parliaments. Yet the electoral 
consequences of this event are not necessarily beneficial. In this paper we assessed the 
electoral consequences of entering national parliament for the first time. We presented a 
party-centred perspective to theorize core factors shaping a) a party’s organizational capacity 
to cope with demands coming with entry and b) the intensity of functional demands a new 
party is exposed to after its breakthrough. Applying multilevel analyses to a new dataset 
covering organizationally new parties entering their parliament across 17 advanced 
democracies over nearly five decades, revealed the following: New parties that enter 
parliament quickly after their foundation, entrepreneurial parties formed without societal 
roots and parties that experience a change in leadership during their first term in parliament 
tend to lose more votes at the follow-up election than other newcomers. Early government 
performance did not have the expected detrimental effect, neither were new right parties 
particularly vulnerable or ideologically distinct parties more resilient in the short term. These 
findings stress the importance to systematically consider organizational characteristics when 
studying new party performance, an issue already raised in the literature (e.g. Mudde 2007), 
but so far little considered in large-N comparative analyses.  
 In our theoretical part, we presented reasons why time for party building or party 
origin should help parties to cope with parliamentary breakthrough better: Entrepreneurs are 
likely to perform less well after breakthrough than rooted formations because they are less 
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able to recruit loyal and capable members and candidates, especially early on when they have 
not yet formed a viable infrastructure, while rooted formations can rely on their ties to 
organized groups serving as a recruitment pool right from the start (Art 2011). Time for party 
building serves as proxy for the relative fluidity of newcomers’ support base as well as of 
their infrastructure. A very young party that enters parliament right after formation has little 
time to institutionalize and consolidate support. This implies that the party easily falls into 
disarray when being confronted with new demands that trigger tensions in the organization at 
a time when voters and followers still desert the party easily being not (yet) emotionally 
affiliated to it (de Lange and Art 2011). 
Our findings lead to three broader issues that deserve closer examination in future 
cross-national comparative research. First, it is crucial to explore further how the timing of 
major events in a party’s life cycle transforms what constitutes success in the short term (such 
as electoral success, parliamentary entry or government participation) into a detrimental 
factor in the long term (van Haute and Pilet 2006: 307-10). Overall, our findings suggest that 
to understand performance patterns, the nature of events and the challenges they pose are less 
relevant than the relative vulnerability of a party organization exposed to them at the time a 
particular event occurs. While a range of cross-national studies assess parties’ strategic entry 
into electoral contests (most of which never gain representation) (Hug 2001), more attention 
needs to be paid to parties’ organizational evolution before they participate successfully in 
elections and enter parliament, a theme dealt with predominantly by case study research. 
Second, and linked to this, we need to learn more about the repercussions of leadership 
discontinuity, another dimension difficult to study in large-N designs (but see Litton 2015). 
Our findings imply that leadership discontinuity is often but not necessarily negative for a 
new parties’ electoral performance after breakthrough. Indeed, the change of leader might 
improve a party’s image and its functioning if a successor is more popular or skilful than its 
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predecessor. Thus discontinuity can at times constitute a beneficial renewal (Harmel et al 
1995: 4). That said, major changes in political parties such as change of leadership are 
usually associated with a party suffering heavy defeat (Cross and Blais 2012). This suggests 
that if a party changes its leader after a major success such as entering national parliament 
this (if it is not a mere procedural requirement which is rare) such a step is often linked to 
some internal difficulty. At the very least our findings imply that change of leadership in 
crucial stages of party development is likely to be a risky enterprise. Thus, future cross-
national work on new party performance needs to explore in greater depth when and how a 
party manages leadership turnover and how it impacts on a party’s evolution in different 
political settings. And finally, while the (in)stability of leadership can be an important 
indication of how a party copes during its first legislative term, we still lack appropriate tools 
to capture the actual parliamentary performance of newcomers across a wider range of parties 
and political systems as existing measures are tailored to the study of major parties.
17
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 Recent cross-national research on leadership and party performance measures ‘party political performance’ 
through indicators such as a) whether a party is in government or not, b) whether it holds the position of prime 
minister or c) whether it is a major or minor party (O’Brien 2015: 1028-9; see for a similar approach Ennser-
Jedenastik and Müller 2015). While we capture government participation, the remaining categories hardly 
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Table 1: Results of Random-effect Multilevel Models  
 Relative Vote Loss 
Government Responsibility -0.08 (0.22) 
New Right 0.25 (0.18) 
Entrepreneur -0.33 (0.15)** 
Time for Party Building 0.03 (0.01)*** 
Leadership Discontinuity -0.24 (0.15)* 
Parliamentary Threshold -0.22 (0.29) 
State Funding Access 0.08 (0.22) 
Broadcasting Access 0.03 (0.19) 
Ideological Distinctiveness 0.08 (0.15) 





Constant 0.18 (0.28) 
Country-level Intercept Variance: Election 0.00 (0.00) 
Country-level Intercept Variance: Country 0.00 (0.00) 
Log likelihood -154.41 
BIC 377.50 
N (countries) 17 
N (elections) 91 
N (parties) 135 
Note: Coefficients of linear random-effect multilevel models, standard errors in brackets, levels of significance: 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Table 2: Predicted Values of Relative Vote Loss  
Variable Score Predicted Values of Relative 
Vote Loss 
Entrepreneur 0 16.5% 
1 -16.1% 
Time for Party Building 0 (Minimum) -11.8% 
 10 20.0% 
 20 51.8% 
 30 83.6% 
 40 (Maximum) 115.4% 
Leadership Discontinuity 0 8.6% 




Appendix: Descriptive Statistics 
Table A1: Country Characteristics 
 Total Number of Parties Average Relative Vote 
Share Difference 
Australia 8 -0.33 
Austria 3 0.51 
Belgium 9 0.27 
Canada 4 -0.24 
Denmark 7 0.09 
Finland 7 -0.13 
France 9 -0.29 
Germany 2 0.66 
Iceland 10 -0.36 
Ireland 7 -0.37 
Luxemburg 7 -0.26 
The Netherlands 17 0.02 
New Zealand 10 -0.14 
Norway 7 -0.02 
Sweden 3 -0.02 
Switzerland 12 0.68 
UK 13 0.23 
   
Total/Average 135 0.01 
 







Entrepreneur (Party Origin) 48.89% 0.50 0 1 
Parliamentary Threshold 0.47 0.35 0.06 1.32 
Ideological Distinctiveness 37.04% 0.48 0 1 
New Right 22.22% 0.42 0 1 
State Funding Access 78.5% 0.41 0 1 
Broadcasting Access 75.6% 0.43 0 1 
Government Participation 10.37% 0.31 0 1 
Time for Party Building 3.88 6.79 0 40 
Leadership Discontinuity 34.07% 0.48 0 1 
GDP Difference* 36.08 25.82 -2.13 136.70 
* In million US dollar per capita.
 
